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IN RE K-DUR ANTITRUST LITIGATION: THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S
CONTROVERSIAL PAY-FOR-DELAY ANTITRUST DECISION
SPLITS WITH OTHER CIRCUIT COURTS
CARL W. HITTINGER & LESLI C. ESPOSITO*
ON July 16, 2012, in a controversial departure from the prevailingstandard for analyzing the anticompetitive effects of so-called “pay-
for-delay” settlement agreements in prescription drug cases, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation,1 rejected
the “scope of the patent” test utilized by many of its sister circuits.2  Adopt-
ing a “quick look” rule of reason analysis, a three-judge panel of the Third
Circuit, consisting of Circuit Judges Dolores Sloviter and Thomas Vanas-
kie, and District Judge Lawrence Stengel (sitting by designation) directed
the District of New Jersey on remand to treat any payment from the pat-
ent-holder, Schering-Plough Corporation (“Schering”), to the generic
drug manufacturers, Upsher-Smith Laboratories (“Upsher”) and ESI Led-
erle, Inc. (“ESI”), as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of
trade.3  The Third Circuit ruled, in an opinion authored by Circuit Judge
Sloviter for the unanimous panel, that Schering, Upsher, and ESI could
then try to rebut that evidence by showing that the payments were made
for a purpose other than delayed entry into the market, or by offering a
pro-competitive benefit.4  This precedential decision imposes a formida-
ble hurdle for pharmaceutical companies to clear before their pay-for-de-
lay settlement agreements are found lawful and not in violation of federal
antitrust laws.
I. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
Any pharmaceutical company wishing to market a new prescription
drug to the consuming public must first obtain approval from the Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) by submitting a New Drug Application,
* Carl W. Hittinger is the chairman of DLA Piper’s litigation group in
Philadelphia, where he concentrates his practice in complex commercial trial and
appellate litigation with a particular emphasis on antitrust and unfair competition
matters.  He can be reached at carl.hittinger@dlapiper.com.  Lesli C. Esposito is a
partner in DLA Piper’s Philadelphia office.  She focuses her litigation practice on
antitrust and unfair competition matters, and was formerly a senior attorney with
the Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Competition.  She can be reached at
lesli.esposito@dlapiper.com.  The authors wish to extend their sincere thanks to
Erin Keltz for her assistance on this article.
1. 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
2. See id.
3. Id. at 218.
4. Id.
(103)
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otherwise known as an NDA.5  This is an exhaustive, time-consuming, and
expensive process that requires the drug manufacturer to produce infor-
mation and data regarding the method of producing the drug, results of
studies and tests, as well as any patents issued for the drug.6  Prior to 1984,
this was the only method of obtaining FDA approval, regardless of whether
the pharmaceutical company was the first to market.7  Indeed, every appli-
cant had to submit an NDA, complete with results on the safety and effec-
tiveness of the drug, even if those same studies had already been
performed and submitted for drugs with the same or similar active ingre-
dients.8  What made this process even more cumbersome was that the very
act of performing these studies, if there existed a patent on the drug that
was the subject of these studies, would constitute an act of patent infringe-
ment on the part of the subsequent filer.9
Attempting to ease the headaches caused by this arduous and costly
process, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, in 1984.10
This piece of legislation allowed generic drug manufacturers to file a
shortened version of the NDA, known as an Abbreviated New Drug Appli-
cation, or an ANDA, which relies on the information included in an NDA
previously filed for a patented drug, as well as the FDA’s determination of
that drug’s safety and effectiveness.11  When filing an ANDA, a generic
drug manufacturer must certify that the proposed generic drug does not
infringe the patent on file with the FDA.12  It can do this in four different
ways, one of which is known as a “paragraph IV certification.”13  Under a
paragraph IV certification, a generic drug manufacturer declares that the
patent either is invalid or will not be infringed by the generic drug manu-
facturer’s production, use, or sale of the new drug.14  When a generic
manufacturer certifies that its proposed generic drug will not infringe a
patent by means of a paragraph IV certification, it must also notify each
patent owner that will be affected by the ANDA.15  Upon receipt of this
notice from the generic drug manufacturer, the patent holder has forty-
5. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
6. See id. § 355(b)(1).
7. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir.
2003).
8. See id.
9. See id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)) (“Except as otherwise provided in this
title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”).
10. See Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified in scattered sections
of 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.).
11. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j); see also Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1296 (explaining
ANDA filing process).
12. See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
13. See id.
14. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
15. Id. § 355(j)(2)(B).
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five days within which to file an infringement action in federal court.16
Once an infringement action is filed, the FDA is then barred from approv-
ing the generic manufacturer’s ANDA for thirty months or until the reso-
lution of the infringement action, whichever occurs first.17
The primary goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to increase the availa-
bility of low-cost drugs to the consuming public.18  This goal was intended
to be achieved by increasing competition in the pharmaceutical drug mar-
ket through incentives provided to generic drug manufacturers.19  One
such incentive is a 180-day exclusivity period provided to the first generic
manufacturer to file an ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification.20
During this period, the FDA cannot approve any subsequent ANDAs.21
II. PAY-FOR-DELAY
When generic drug manufacturers attempt to enter the market early,
lengthy and expensive patent litigation often results.  Add to that the risk
of losing profits afforded by a patent, and most patent-holders prefer to
settle these lawsuits to protect their market share.  One such settlement is
known as the “reverse payment” agreement, or the “pay-for-delay” agree-
ment.  In these types of agreements, a patent holder pays one or more
generic drug manufacturers to stay out of the market until an agreed-
upon date.  Oftentimes, that date may be years prior to the expiration of
the patent at issue, but still years after the infringement action is settled.
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), along with direct and indi-
rect purchasers of prescription drugs, advocacy groups, and competitors,
has taken issue with pay-for-delay agreements for years, alleging violations
of state and federal antitrust laws, including the Sherman Antitrust Act
(“Sherman Act”).  Section 1 of the Sherman Act generally prohibits
“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
16. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
17. Id.  If the court decides that the patent is invalid or not infringed prior to
the expiration of the thirty months, approval of the ANDA will be made effective
on the date on which the court enters judgment on the decision. Id.  If, on the
other hand, the court finds that the patent is valid and infringed, approval of the
ANDA will be made effective on or after the date the patent will expire. Id. See also
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A).
18. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2647.
19. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
20. Id.  This 180-day exclusivity period begins to run on the day the first ge-
neric drug manufacturer to file an ANDA begins to market its drug, or the day on
which a court hearing the underlying infringement action determines that the pat-
ent is invalid or was not infringed. Id.
21. What this necessarily also means is that, during the thirty-month stay trig-
gered at the filing of an infringement action by a patent holder, the FDA can also
not approve any subsequent ANDAs filed by additional generic drug
manufacturers.
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with foreign nations . . . .”22  It is understood that the ban on “contract[s]
. . . in restraint of trade” means only those contracts that are unreasonable
or impair competition.23
In determining the unreasonableness of contracts, including pay-for-
delay agreements, many courts have applied the “rule of reason” analy-
sis.24  Under this framework, “the finder of fact must decide whether the
questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition,
taking into account a variety of factors, including specific information
about the relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.”25  Courts have
simplified this analysis into three steps.  First, the challenger must show
that the conduct at issue has generated anticompetitive effects.26  The bur-
den then shifts to the defendant to show that the conduct at issue has a
pro-competitive effect.27  If the defendant successfully advances a suffi-
cient pro-competitive objective, the plaintiff can then rebut that by show-
ing that the conduct is not necessary to achieve that objective.28
There are some types of agreements that are so obviously anticompe-
titive, however, that they can be deemed to violate antitrust laws by virtue
of the nature of the restraint.29  This occurs when a “practice facially ap-
pears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competi-
tion or decrease output.”30  These types of agreements have become
known as “per se” violations of antitrust laws.31
More recently, some courts have taken a different approach when an-
alyzing the lawfulness of pay-for-delay agreements, explaining that patents
are, by their very nature, anticompetitive, and, as such, would not survive
under the rule of reason analysis.  These courts have begun to follow what
is called the “scope of the patent” test.32  Taking into account the monop-
olistic effects of patents, these courts follow a test that requires examina-
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
23. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)) (interpreting Sherman Act
provision).
24. See id. (citing State Oil, 522 U.S. at 10) (discussing rule of reason analysis).
25. Id. (quoting State Oil, 522 U.S. at 10).
26. Id. (citing United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993)).
27. Id. (citing Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669).
28. Id. (citing Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669).
29. Id. (citing State Oil, 522 U.S. at 10).
30. Id. (quoting Broad Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979)).
31. See id.  Still other courts apply a framework that falls between the rule of
reason analysis and the “per se” analysis. Id.  Under this “quick look” analysis, the
plaintiff is merely required to show that the defendant’s behavior is similar to that
which has been deemed to be “per se” anticompetitive in the past. Id.  Proof of
anticompetitive effects is not required, but the defendant then must present pro-
competitive objectives. Id.
32. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005);
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003); In re An-
droGel Antitrust Litig., 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
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tion of: “(1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the
extent to which the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting
anticompetitive effects.”33  Essentially, these courts determine whether any
provisions of the pay-for-delay agreement are more exclusive than the pat-
ent at issue, and, if so, subject those provisions to further antitrust scrutiny.
III. NOTEWORTHY PAY-FOR-DELAY CASES
Prior to the Third Circuit’s decision in In re K-Dur, the trend among
the circuits was to uphold pay-for-delay settlement agreements unless the
agreement’s anticompetitive effects extended beyond the scope of the un-
derlying patent.  The three circuits to have most recently decided pay-for-
delay cases upheld the pay-for-delay settlement agreements at issue in
those cases under the scope of the patent test.34  The Third Circuit’s deci-
sion in In re K-Dur has now created a notable split among the circuits,
three of which have adopted the scope of the patent test and three of
which seemingly adhere to different variations of the rule of reason
analysis.
A. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp. International and In re:
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation
In 2001, in an action brought by a competing pharmaceutical com-
pany, the D.C. Circuit was one of the first courts to consider a pay-for-delay
agreement in Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp. International.35
Unlike In re K-Dur, the agreement at issue in Andrx was not a litigation-
ending patent settlement.36  Instead, the agreement was made between a
patent-holder and a generic manufacturer while litigation continued, and
simply provided for delayed entry into the market, which manipulated the
180-day exclusivity period, and prevented subsequent generic drug manu-
facturers from entering the market.37
By way of background, Andrx Pharmaceuticals (“Andrx”) filed an
ANDA and a paragraph IV certification for a generic formulation of the
prescription drug Cardizem CD, which was manufactured and marketed
by the patent holder, Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (“HMRI”).38  HMRI
then timely filed an infringement action against Andrx.39  Subsequent to
the filing of the infringement action, several other generic drug manufac-
33. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1066 (citing Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1312).
34. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012); In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re:
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006); Schering-Plough
Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm.,
Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).
35. 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
36. See generally id. at 803–05.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 803.
39. Id.
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turers filed ANDAs, including Biovail.40  After Biovail filed its ANDA, how-
ever, Andrx and HMRI entered into an agreement under which Andrx
agreed to keep its generic form of Cardizem CD off the market until a
date agreed upon by both parties, and HMRI agreed to compensate Andrx
in the amount of $40 million per year.41  In July 1998, Andrx’s ANDA was
approved by the FDA, and, by that time, the thirty month waiting period
had expired during which Andrx was prohibited from marketing its ge-
neric drug.42  Despite the fact that Andrx was now permitted to market its
generic drug, it chose not to do so because of the agreement, and HMRI
began making payments to Andrx for its compliance with the agree-
ment.43  By choosing to not market its generic form of Cardizem CD,
Andrx did not trigger the 180-day exclusivity period, which effectively pre-
vented any subsequent ANDAs from being approved by the FDA.44
Biovail filed suit, alleging antitrust violations, and the district court
dismissed the claims with prejudice, concluding that Biovail did not and
could not plead an antitrust injury that was caused by the agreement be-
tween HMRI and Andrx.45  The D.C. Circuit, however, reversed the dis-
trict court’s decision, and found that, not only was the payment from
HMRI to Andrx prima facie evidence of an illegal agreement in restraint
of trade, the agreement could “reasonably be viewed as an attempt to allo-
cate market share and preserve monopolistic conditions.”46  While the
court did acknowledge that Biovail failed to allege an injury-in-fact in its
complaint, it did not agree that the injury was a result of “the existence of
a troublesome statutory scheme.”47  Indeed, the court stated that but for
the pay-for-delay agreement, Andrx would have entered the market upon
approval of its ANDA, triggering the 180-day exclusivity period, the end of
which would have permitted Biovail’s entry into the market.48
40. Id.
41. Id.  HMRI’s payments to Andrx were to begin on the date Andrx’s ANDA
was approved by the FDA and end on the date that Andrx began to market the
drug or HMRI was successful in its infringement suit. Id.
42. Id. at 804.
43. Id.  Prior to its ANDA approval, Andrx filed suit against the FDA seeking
clarification concerning its rights as a first filer. Id. at 803–04.  Specifically, Andrx
sought a declaration that stated that the FDA was prohibited from approving any
ANDA filed subsequent to Andrx’s ANDA until at least 180 days after Andrx began
marketing its generic form of Cardizem CD or HMRI was successful in its patent
litigation. Id. at 804.  The FDA provided Andrx the relief it sought in the form of a
notice published in July of 1998. Id. at 804 n.6.
44. Id. at 804.
45. Id.  Biovail failed to inform the district court that, on December 23, 1999,
the FDA gave final approval to its ANDA. Id.  The district court held that Biovail’s
alleged injury was caused by its lack of FDA approval, and not the agreement be-
tween HMRI and Andrx. Id. at 808.
46. Id. at 811.
47. Id. at 808–09 (quoting Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Friedman, 83 F. Supp. 2d
179, 185 (D.D.C. 2000)).
48. Id. at 809.
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Similarly, In re: Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation49 arose out of the same
pay-for-delay agreement that was considered by the D.C. Circuit in
Andrx.50  This action, however, was brought by direct and indirect pur-
chasers of Cardizem CD who alleged that they were harmed by the agree-
ment between HMRI and Andrx.51  In 2003, the Sixth Circuit issued a
decision similar to that issued by the D.C. Circuit in Andrx.52  The court
found that the agreement there was intended to eliminate competition
throughout the United States.  The Sixth Circuit then went a step further
and held the agreement to be a “per se illegal restraint of trade.”53  The
court added that “it is one thing to take advantage of a monopoly that
naturally arises from a patent, but another thing altogether to bolster the
patent’s effectiveness in inhibiting competitors by paying the only poten-
tial competitor $40 million per year to stay out of the market.”54
B. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Also in 2003, in a consolidated action brought by several private anti-
trust plaintiffs, the Eleventh Circuit strayed from the limited course
charted thus far by the D.C. and Sixth Circuits when it issued its decision
in Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.55  The court not only
found that the patent-holding drug manufacturers were permitted to ex-
clude generic drug manufacturers from the market, but it suggested that
the district court utilize what is now understood to be the beginnings of
the scope of the patent test.56  This case marks the beginning of the trend
which has seen the federal circuits upholding pay-for-delay settlement
agreements.
Beginning in 1993, Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Geneva”) and
Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals (“Zenith”) filed several ANDAs and para-
graph IV certifications for generic formulations of Abbott Laboratories’
(“Abbott”) brand-name drug, Hytrin.57  Abbott filed several infringement
actions against both generic drug manufacturers and the actions were set-
tled as the result of two pay-for-delay agreements.58
Specifically, in March 1998, Abbott and Zenith entered into an agree-
ment under which both parties’ claims and counterclaims in the underly-
ing infringement action were dismissed.59  Furthermore, Zenith agreed to
stay out of the Hytrin market until another generic drug manufacturer
49. 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
50. See id.
51. Id. at 900.
52. For a further discussion of Andrx, see supra notes 34–47.
53. In re: Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 908.
54. Id. (footnote omitted).
55. 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).
56. Id. at 1306, 1311–12.
57. Id. at 1298.
58. Id.at 1298–1300.
59. Id. at 1300.
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entered the market, or a specific Abbott patent expired.60  In return, Ab-
bott agreed to pay Zenith $3 million up front, $3 million after three
months, and $6 million every three months until an agreed-upon date, or
the agreement terminated under its terms.61
Abbott and Geneva entered into a similar agreement in April 1998,
under which Geneva agreed to not sell or distribute any generic form of
Hytrin until one of four events occurred.62  In return, Abbott agreed to
pay Geneva $4.5 million each month until either another generic drug
manufacturer marketed a generic formulation of Hytrin, or Abbott won a
favorable decision in the district court on its infringement claim.63
Several private antitrust plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the agree-
ments were illegal contracts in restraint of trade.64  The district court
granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment that the agreements
were illegal under the Sherman Act.65  The court characterized the agree-
ments as “geographic market allocation Agreements between horizontal
competitors, essentially allocating the entire United States market for [Hy-
trin] to Abbott, who shared its monopoly profits with the other cartel
members during the life of the Agreements.”66  As such, the court held
the agreements to be per se unlawful.67
The Eleventh Circuit, however, reversed the lower court’s decision,
and, in doing so, emphasized the rights a patent grants to its owner, in-
cluding the right to exclude others from the market.68  Instead of utilizing
the per se analysis or the rule of reason analysis, the court developed an
analysis that has evolved into the so-called scope of the patent test.69  The
Eleventh Circuit directed the district court to determine whether any pro-
visions of the agreements went beyond the scope of the patent at issue,
and, if so, to apply traditional antitrust scrutiny to only those provisions.70
60. Id.  The Abbott patent at issue expired on February 17, 2000. Id. at n.13.
61. Id.  The agreed-upon date on which the payments would stop, if the
agreement had not terminated first, was March 17, 2000. Id.
62. Id.  The four events that would trigger the termination of the agreement
between Abbott and Geneva were as follows: 1) Abbott’s patent expired; 2) an-
other generic drug manufacturer introduced a generic formulation of Hytrin to
the market; 3) Geneva obtained a judgment that its generic formulation of Hytrin
did not infringe Abbott’s patent; or 4) Abbott’s patent was invalid. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1296.
65. Id. at 1301.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1304.
69. Id. at 1311–12.
70. Id.
8
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C. In re: Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation
Three years later, the Second Circuit in In re: Tamoxifen Citrate Anti-
trust Litigation71 sided with the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Valley Drug,
and the scope of the patent test began to solidify.72  In fact, the Third
Circuit in In re K-Dur refers to the scope of the patent test alternatively as
the “Tamoxifen test.”73  This case, including both the district and circuit
court opinions, reflects the migration of the scope of the patent test
outside the Eleventh Circuit.74
Shortly after Imperial Chemical Industries, PLC (“ICI”) was awarded
the patent for tamoxifen, Barr Laboratories, Inc. (“Barr”) filed an ANDA
and a paragraph IV certification.75  ICI timely filed a patent infringement
suit, and the district court declared ICI’s patent invalid.76  ICI appealed
the district court’s ruling, and, while the appeal was pending, ICI and Barr
entered into a settlement agreement.77  Under the terms of the settlement
agreement, Barr agreed to change its paragraph IV certification to a para-
graph III certification, effectively agreeing that it would not market its own
generic formulation of tamoxifen until the patent expired in 2002.78  In
return, AstraZeneca PLC (“Zeneca”)79 agreed to provide Barr with a $21
million payment and a non-exclusive license to sell Zeneca-manufactured
tamoxifen under Barr’s label.80  This agreement was also contingent on
Zeneca obtaining a vacatur of the district court judgment holding the
Tamoxifen patent invalid.81
Plaintiffs, a group of consumers, consumer advocacy groups, and
providers of medical benefits, filed suit, alleging that the agreements be-
tween the defendants monopolized the United States market for tamox-
ifen.82  The Second Circuit adhered to a presumption of patent validity
when it affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims, sup-
ported the scope of the patent test, and held that there was no antitrust
71. 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006).
72. See id.
73. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 213 (3d Cir. 2012).
74. Prior to this opinion being issued, the Eleventh Circuit had already issued
its opinion in Schering-Plough, which had also adhered to the scope of the patent
test. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).
75. In re: Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 193.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 193–94.
79. After ICI was awarded the patent, AstraZeneca PLC obtained the owner-
ship rights of the patent. Id. at 193.
80. Id. at 193–94.  Zeneca also agreed to pay Barr’s raw material supplier
more than $45 million over the course of ten years. Id. at 194.
81. Id.  Vacatur of the district court’s judgment was subsequently obtained.
Id.
82. Id. at 190.
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violation because the agreement between Zeneca and Barr “did not unlaw-
fully extend the reach of Zeneca’s tamoxifen patent.”83
Despite its holding, the Second Circuit did acknowledge a potential
problem looming on the horizon with regards to pay-for-delay agree-
ments.  The court explained that “[t]he less sound the patent or the less
clear the infringement, and therefore the less justified the monopoly en-
joyed by the patent holder, the more a rule permitting settlement is likely
to benefit the patent holder by allowing it to retain the patent.”84  The
court frankly explained, however, that cases like these will continue to be
settled so long as there is a judicial preference for settlement.85
D. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation
In 2008, the Federal Circuit became the third federal circuit court to
adhere to the scope of the patent test when it issued its decision in In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation.86  This decision is particularly
noteworthy, as the Federal Circuit has original jurisdiction over patent
cases, and at least one other federal court has refused to overturn a pay-
for-delay settlement agreement for this very reason.87
In October 1991, Barr Labs, Inc. (“Barr”) filed an ANDA and para-
graph IV certification for a generic version of Cipro, which was manufac-
tured and sold by the patent holder, Bayer AG and Bayer Corp.
(collectively “Bayer”).88  Bayer timely filed an infringement action, but just
before trial, Bayer entered into agreements with Barr and several other
parties.89  These agreements provided that, among other things, Barr and
the other parties would not challenge Bayer’s patent.90  In addition, Barr
agreed that it would convert its paragraph IV certification to a paragraph
III certification, effectively preventing Barr from marketing a generic form
of Cipro until after the expiration of Bayer’s patent.91  In exchange, Bayer
agreed to pay $49.1 million to Barr.92  Bayer also agreed to provide Barr
with Cipro for resale or make quarterly payments to Barr until an agreed-
upon date.93
83. Id. at 213.
84. Id. at 211.
85. Id.
86. 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
87. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012).
88. In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1327–28.
89. Id. at 1328.  Rugby Group, Inc. (“Rugby”) entered into an agreement with
Barr in which they would share litigation costs and Barr would then provide to
Rugby half of any profits realized on the sale of generic ciprofloxacin. Id.  Rugby is
a subsidiary of HMRI. Id.  Bernard Sherman is Barr’s principal shareholder, and
Apotex is a company controlled by him. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1328–29.
92. Id. at 1329.
93. Id.  The date agreed upon by Bayer and Barr was December 31, 2003. Id.
The Bayer patent expired on December 9, 2003. Id. at 1328.
10
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In 2000 and 2001, plaintiffs, a group of direct and indirect purchasers
and advocacy groups, filed several antitrust actions in federal court, alleg-
ing that the agreements between Bayer and Barr were illegal market allo-
cations in violation of federal antitrust law.94  The district court dismissed
the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment while granting the defend-
ants’ motion, and, adhering to the growing trend to follow the scope of
the patent test, found that any anticompetitive effects resulting from the
agreement were within the exclusionary zone of the patent.95
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, reiterating
that there were “no anti-competitive effects outside the exclusionary zone
of the patent.”96  The court further explained that, as the patent holder,
Bayer had the right to exclude the other defendants from profiting from
its patented invention.97  Finally, the court noted that the settlement of
patent claims through settlement agreements, as opposed to litigation, is
not automatically precluded by the Sherman Act, even if some anticompe-
titive effects result.98
E. In re AndroGel Antitrust Litigation and FTC v. Watson
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
In 2010 and 2012, two separate opinions were issued as a result of
challenges to the same pay-for-delay agreements between patent-holder
Solvay Pharmaceuticals (“Solvay”) and two generic drug manufacturers.
In 2010, the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia decided an
action filed by the FTC and purchasers of AndroGel in In re AndroGel Anti-
trust Litigation.99  Two years later, the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion in
FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,100 which began as a complaint filed by
the FTC.101  Both decisions adhered to the scope of the patent test origi-
nally suggested by the Eleventh Circuit in Valley Drug, and seemed to ce-
ment the scope of the patent test firmly within the Eleventh Circuit’s
jurisprudence.102
In May 2003, two generic drug manufacturers submitted ANDAs and
paragraph IV certifications for a generic formulation of AndroGel, the pat-
ent of which was held by Solvay.103  Solvay filed timely infringement ac-
94. Id. at 1329.  The several actions were consolidated in the Eastern District
of New York. Id.
95. Id. at 1330.
96. Id. at 1333.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
100. 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012).
101. See id.
102. See In re AndroGel, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1377; see also Watson, 677 F.3d at
1315; Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1311–12 (11th Cir.
2003).
103. In re Androgel, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1374.
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tions against both generic drug manufacturers, and, despite going
through extensive litigation in both actions, ultimately settled both suits
before any court decisions were handed down.104  Under the agreements,
Solvay agreed to voluntarily dismiss its infringement actions, and both ge-
neric drug manufacturers agreed to remain off the AndroGel market until
an agreed-upon date or the date on which another company began to
market a generic formulation of AndroGel.105  Solvay further agreed to
share profits of AndroGel with both generic drug manufacturers if they
would promote AndroGel to urologists and primary care physicians.106
The Northern District of Georgia chose to follow the scope of the
patent test established by the Eleventh Circuit when analyzing the lawful-
ness of the agreements.107  In doing so, the court explained that “neither
the rule of reason nor the per se analysis is appropriate when a patent
settlement is involved.”108  Moving step-by-step through the scope of the
patent test, the court found that the agreements provided only for the
exclusion of generic AndroGel, and only until August 31, 2015—a full five
years less than what is provided for in the patent itself.109  Additionally,
the agreements prevent only the parties to the agreement from marketing
the generic formulation of AndroGel prior to the agreed-upon date.110  As
a result, the court found that the agreements did not hinder competition
any more than the patent already did.
In Watson, the FTC asked the Eleventh Circuit to adopt a “rule that an
exclusion payment is unlawful if, viewing the situation objectively as of the
time of the settlement, it is more likely than not that the patent would not
have blocked generic entry earlier than the agreed-upon entry date.”111
The court refused to do so for several reasons.  First, the court explained
that the suggested rule would require a determination of how likely a pat-
ent holder was to succeed in a lawsuit that had already been settled.112
Second, not only would the rule impose heavy burdens on the court, but
the Eleventh Circuit said the courts are “ill-equipped to make a judgment
104. Id. at 1374–75.
105. Id. at 1375.  The agreed-upon date for both parties was August 31, 2015 if
the first-filer did not assert its 180-day exclusivity period. Id.  If the first-filer as-
serted its 180-day exclusivity period, the first-filer could enter the market on that
date, and the subsequent filer could enter on February 28, 2016. Id.
106. Id.  Solvay estimated that its payments to the generic drug manufacturers
under the agreement to share profits would be anywhere between $23 million and
$38 million per year. Id.
107. Id. at 1377.  The FTC and purchasers of AndroGel filed the instant ac-
tion. Id. at 1375–76.
108. Id. at 1377 (citing Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065
(11th Cir. 2005)).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012).
112. Id. at 1312–13.
12
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about the merits of a patent infringement claim.”113  Finally, the court
deferred to existing precedent in the circuit.114  In doing so, the Eleventh
Circuit found that the pay-for-delay agreements at issue did not exceed the
scope of the underlying patents, and, as a result, the agreements were not
found to be illegal restraints of trade.115  After the court issued its deci-
sion, the FTC sought review of the decision, and, on December 7, 2012,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
IV. THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S CONTROVERSIAL DECISION IN IN RE K-DUR
In the face of multiple decisions on both sides of the coin from sev-
eral circuits, the Third Circuit, in In re K-Dur, approached the issue of pay-
for-delay settlement agreements differently than any court to date.116
Even with the guidance provided by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC,117 which considered the legality of the very
same pay-for-delay agreement, the court chose to chart a new path.118
Schering manufactures and markets K-Dur 20 (“K-Dur”), which is a
sustained-release potassium chloride supplement used to treat potassium
deficiency.119  While potassium chloride is a commonly used pharmaceuti-
cal ingredient, and, as a result, unpatentable, Schering did receive a pat-
ent in 1989 on a process called “microencapsulation,” which allowed the
manufacturer to compress an entire day’s worth of the supplement into
one sustained-release tablet.120
In 1995, Upsher filed an ANDA and paragraph IV certification for a
generic version of K-Dur called Klor Con M20 (“Klor Con”).121  Schering
timely filed a patent infringement action, but, on the night before trial was
to begin, Schering and Upsher reached a settlement.122  Under the terms
of the settlement agreement, Upsher agreed to keep Klor Con off the mar-
ket until September 1, 2001.123  In exchange, Schering agreed to a deal
under which it would obtain licenses to market five Upsher products, and
Schering would pay Upsher $60 million in “up-front royalties,” $10 million
in milestone payments, and royalties on the net sales of the licensed
products.124
113. Id. at 1314–15 (explaining that Congress has given Federal Circuit exclu-
sive jurisdiction over patent cases, and Eleventh Circuit has no expertise or experi-
ence in area).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1312–13.
116. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
117. 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).
118. See generally In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d 197.
119. Brief of Appellees at 8, In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir.
2012) (No. 10-2077).
120. Id.  This patent expired in September 2006. Id. at 9.
121. See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1058.
122. Id. at 1060.
123. Id. at 1059.
124. Id. at 1059–60.
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At the same time, another pharmaceutical company, ESI, filed an
ANDA and paragraph IV certification, seeking FDA approval to market its
generic formulation of K-Dur called Micro-K 20 (“Micro-K”).125  Schering
filed an infringement action, and, after more than a year of court-ordered
mediation, Schering and ESI settled.126  The agreement provided for
Micro K’s entry into the market on January 1, 2004, and, in return, Scher-
ing agreed to pay ESI up to $10 million if ESI received FDA approval by an
agreed-upon date.127
In March 2002, the FTC filed a complaint against Schering, Upsher,
and ESI, alleging that the agreements were illegal restraints of trade.128
The Administrative Law Judge held that the settlement agreements were
not illegal, and explained that the evaluation should focus on the strength
of the patent and its exclusionary power, utilizing the same analysis as the
Eleventh, Second, and Federal Circuits used in upholding various pay-for-
delay settlement agreements.129  Without going as far as calling the pay-
ments to Upsher and ESI per se anticompetitive, the full Commission re-
versed the ALJ, and found that the settlements violated Section 5 of the
FTC Act and the Sherman Act.130
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Schering-Plough adhered
to its precedent and reversed the Commission.131  While the court agreed
with both the ALJ and the Commission that the payments from Schering
to Upsher and ESI were not per se anticompetitive, it did find that the rule
of reason analysis utilized by both of the lower tribunals was unsuitable in
a case such as this.132  The court reiterated that the proper framework to
be utilized in patent cases is the scope of the patent test suggested in Valley
Drug.133  The anticompetitive effects of the agreements, as determined by
the court in its application of the scope of the patent test, were found to
be non-existent.  Absent evidence to the contrary, Schering’s patent was
presumed valid, which gave Schering the right to exclude infringing com-
petitors from the market until September 5, 2006.134  The agreements,
however, provided for early entry into the market for both Upsher and
ESI.135  As negotiated, the exclusionary effect of the agreements was nar-
rower than the patent itself.136  As a result, the court found that there
were no anticompetitive effects beyond that which the patent already pro-
125. Id. at 1060.
126. Id. at 1060–61.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1061.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1062.
131. Id. at 1076.
132. Id. at 1065.
133. Id. at 1066.
134. Id. at 1067.
135. Id. at 1067–68.
136. Id. at 1074.
14
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vided.  Thus, the agreements were found legal.  The FTC filed a petition
for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.  Ultimately, the petition was
denied.
In addition to the complaint filed by the FTC, In re K-Dur arose out of
the very same pay-for-delay settlement agreements as considered by the
Eleventh Circuit in Schering-Plough when several private parties filed ac-
tions against Schering, Upsher, and ESI, in the District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Jersey, alleging various antitrust violations.137  In February
2009, former federal judge Stephen Orlofsky, the assigned Special Master
responsible for handling all motions in the consolidated action, issued a
Report and Recommendation granting defendants’ motions for summary
judgment.138  In doing so, he relied on the presumption that Schering’s
patent was valid, enabling it to exclude—even through reverse payment
settlements—infringing generic medicines until the expiration of the pat-
ent term.139  The Special Master further held that the agreements did not
exceed the scope of the patent, and the underlying infringement actions
were not objectively baseless.140  Thereafter, Chief Judge Greenaway sim-
ply adopted Special Master Orlofsky’s Report and Recommendation in its
entirety.141
Plaintiffs appealed their case to the Third Circuit, which then re-
versed the district court’s decision.142  Before beginning its analysis, the
Third Circuit noted that “[a]s a practical matter, the scope of the patent
test does not subject reverse payment agreements to any antitrust scrutiny.
As the antitrust defendants concede, no court applying the scope of the
patent test has ever permitted a reverse payment antitrust case to go to
trial.”143  The court then asserted that it did not agree with the trend in its
sister circuits to follow the scope of the patent test.144  Supporting its asser-
tion, Circuit Judge Sloviter, writing for the unanimous court, found at
odds with antitrust law the “almost unrebuttable presumption” that pat-
137. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, 686 F.3d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 2012).  These
actions were consolidated in the District of New Jersey by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation. Id.
138. Id. at 208.
139. Id.
140. Id.  Hatch-Waxman cases allow antitrust plaintiffs to assert a claim of
“sham litigation” in the context of reverse payment agreements. See In re AndroGel
Antitrust Litig., 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2010).  To prove an allega-
tion of sham litigation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the lawsuit is objectively
baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success
on the merits, and the party bringing the allegedly baseless suit did so with the
subjective motivation to interfere directly with the business relationships of a com-
petitor. Id.
141. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., No. 01-1652, 2010 WL 1172995 (D.N.J.
Mar. 25, 2010), rev’d, 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
142. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218.
143. Id. at 214.
144. Id.
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ents at issue in Hatch-Waxman cases are valid.145  The court explained
that, although the party challenging the validity of a patent bears the bur-
den of proving that the patent is, in fact, not valid, this is merely “a proce-
dural device and is not a substantive right of the patent holder.”146
Furthermore, the court urged other courts to keep in mind that a patent is
nothing more than a “legal conclusion reached by the Patent Office.”147
The Third Circuit also took issue with the assumption that subsequent
challenges by additional generic drug manufacturers will serve to invali-
date weak patents that would otherwise remain in effect because of a re-
verse payment made to the initial challenger.148  While idealistic, this is
not realistic, according to the court, as many patent-holding drug manu-
facturers reap such great rewards by being the first to market that they are
often able to pay several generic drug manufacturers substantial sums to
remain off the market.149
Finally, the court found pay-for-delay settlement agreements, the fre-
quency of which have increased under the Hatch-Waxman Act, to be at
odds with the stated goals of the Act.150  With the goal of increasing the
availability of low-cost drugs through increased competition, pay-for-delay
agreements have the effect, according to the court, of stifling competi-
tion.151  Furthermore, the court found that the application of the scope of
the patent test does nothing to rectify the anticompetitive effects of pay-
for-delay agreements.152
In flatly rejecting the scope of the patent test, the Third Circuit di-
rected the district court to apply a “quick look” rule of reason analysis, not
a per se standard, but noted that utilization of this test would not preclude
patent settlements in the future, and would subject to antitrust scrutiny
only reverse payment agreements.153  In applying the quick look rule of
reason analysis, the court instructed the district court to treat any payment
from a patent-holder to a generic drug manufacturer as prima facie evi-
dence of an unreasonable restraint of trade.154  This, the court held, can
then be rebutted by a showing that the payment was for a purpose other
than delayed entry into the market, or by offering a pro-competitive bene-
fit.155  The Third Circuit, however, failed to delineate what might be such
a legitimate purpose or benefit leaving that for future cases to sort out.
After this decision was handed down, the defendant pharmaceutical com-
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 215 (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S.  653, 670 (1969)).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 217.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 217–18.
154. Id. at 218.
155. Id.
16
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panies filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court with-
out seeking a rehearing en banc by the full Third Circuit.  Although the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Watson, it has not yet denied cer-
tiorari in this case.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has, for years, declined to review pay-for-delay
settlement agreements.  The time has come for guidance from the Court.
Not only is there a clear circuit court split regarding the settlements, gen-
erally, but one specific settlement, in particular, was decided differently by
two different circuit courts.  Additionally, while one standard of analysis
has been predominant over the past decade—specifically, the scope of the
patent test—the other side of the aisle presents variations on another stan-
dard—the quick look rule of reason analysis.  Review of this issue is neces-
sary to provide direction on how to proceed in a nationwide
pharmaceutical market.  The Court’s future decision in Watson will pro-
vide the necessary guidance for both pharmaceutical companies and chal-
lengers of pay-for-delay agreements.
While the parties await a decision from the Supreme Court on
whether pay-for-delay settlement agreements are legal, it is unclear how
pharmaceutical companies wishing to enter into such agreements, in the
meantime, should proceed.  Various lawsuits challenging pay-for-delay
agreements were stayed prior to the Supreme Court’s decision granting
certiorari on the pay-for-delay issue, while others were not.156  Now that
the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Watson, it would only seem
prudent to stay all pay-for-delay cases currently pending until the Court
makes a definitive decision on the legality of reverse payment agreements.
Of note is the fact that when the Supreme Court issued its order
granting certiorari in Watson, not only did Justice Samuel Alito recuse him-
self from the case, but the Court made no mention of the petitions filed by
Merck and Upsher, despite the near identical pay-for-delay agreements at
issue in the cases.157  Given the fact that the Third Circuit is the only court
156. See Ama Sarfo, Effexor Pay-for-Delay Suit Awaits High Court’s K-Dur Answer,
LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2012, 8:44 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/389024/ef-
fexor-pay-for-delay-suit-awaits-high-court-s-k-dur-answer (explaining that case in-
volving agreement between Wyeth, LLC, and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.
(“Teva”) has been stayed); see also Alison Frankel, New Pay-for-Delay Twist: NJ Judge
Says If No Pay, Deals Are Legal, THOMSON REUTERS (Dec. 7, 2012), http://newsand
insight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/ViewNews.aspx?id=63210&terms=%40
ReutersTopicCodes+CONTAINS+’ANV’ (discussing how GlaxoSmithKline and
Teva case was dismissed); Django Gold, GSK, Teva Can’t Put Brakes on Pay-For-Delay
Challenge, LAW 360 (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.law360.com/articles/389298 (ex-
plaining that lawsuit challenging agreement between GlaxoSmithKline PLC and
Teva is continuing to move forward despite then-pending grant of certiorari).
157. See Federal Trade Commission v. Watson Pharm., Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, http:/
/www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/federal-trade-commission-v-watson-pharma
ceuticals-inc/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2013).
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that has strayed from the trend in the federal courts, however, one can
assume that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Watson to affirm the
reasoning of the court in In re K-Dur.158  Stay tuned.
158. See Daniel Fisher, Supreme Court Takes Generic “Pay To Delay” Case, FORBES
(Dec. 7, 2012, 5:18 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/12/07/
supreme-court-takes-generic-pay-to-delay-case/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=
twitter.
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